	Page 1
1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
3	Case No. 19-23649-rdd
4	x
5	In the Matter of:
6	
7	PURDUE PHARMA L.P.,
8	
9	Debtor.
10	x
11	
12	United States Bankruptcy Court
13	300 Quarropas Street, Room 248
14	White Plains, NY 10601
15	
16	December 16, 2021
17	10:06 AM
18	
19	
20	
21	BEFORE:
22	HON ROBERT D. DRAIN
23	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
24	
25	ECRO: UNKNOWN

Page 2 1 HEARING re Notice of Agenda / Agenda for December 16, 2021 2 Hearing (ECF #4223) 3 HEARING re Objection / Motion to Object to Payments for all 4 5 parties and other relief filed by Ellen Isaacs. (ECF #3963) 6 Notice of Objection /Motion to Object to Payments for all 7 parties and other relief with hearing to be held on 12/16/2021 at 10:00 AM at Videoconference (ZoomGov) (RDD) 8 9 (related document(s)3963). (ECF #3964) 10 11 HEARING re Notice of Hearing Regarding Motion to Object to 12 Payments for all Parties and Other Relief Filed by Ellen 13 Isaacs (related document(s)3963) filed by James I. McClammy 14 on behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P.. with hearing to be held 15 on 12/16/2021 at 10:00 AM (ECF #3968). 16 17 HEARING re Objection / Debtors' Objection to Ellen Isaacs' 18 Motion to Object to Payments for all Parties and Other Relief (related document(s)3963) filed by James I. McClammy 19 20 on behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF #4212) 21 22 HEARING re Motion to File Proof of Claim After Claims Bar 23 Date filed by Robert P. Caulk with hearing to be held on 12/16/2021 at 10:00 AM at Videoconference (ZoomGov) (RDD 24 25 (ECF #4072)

Page 3 1 HEARING re Objection / Debtors' Omnibus Objection to Motions 2 to File Proofs of Claim after Claims Bar Date Filed By Robert Caulk and Lamere Wilmer-Williamson (related 3 4 document(s)4073, 4072) filed by James I. McClammy on 5 behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF #4213) 6 7 HEARING re Motion to File Proof of Claim After Claims Bar 8 Date filed by Lamere Wilmer with hearing to be held on 9 12/16/2021 at 10:00 AM at Videoconference (ZoomGov) 10 (RDD)(ECF #4073) 11 12 HEARING re Objection / Debtors' Omnibus Objection to Motions 13 to File Proofs of Claim after Claims Bar Date Filed By 14 Robert Caulk and Lamere Wilmer-Williamson (related 15 document(s)4073, 4072) filed by James I. McClammy on 16 behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF #4213) 17 HEARING re Notice of Hearing of Sixth Interim Fee filed by 18 19 Eli J. Vonnegut on behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P.. with 20 hearing to be held on 12/16/2021 at 10:00 AM at 21 Videoconference (ZoomGov) (RDD) Objections due by 12/9/2021 22 (ECF #4150) 23 24 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 25 / Sixth Interim Fee Application of Dechert LLP, as 327(e)

Page 4 1 Special Counsel, for Compensation for Professional Services 2 Rendered and Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses 3 Incurred During the Period June 1, 2021 Through September 30, 2021 for Dechert LLP, Debtor's Attorney, period: 4 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$2,843,056.28, expenses: 5 6 \$20,560.42. filed by Dechert LLP. 7 (Vasser, Shmuel) (ECF #4117) 8 9 HEARING re Sixth Application for Interim Professional 10 Compensation for Arnold & Porter Kaye Scholer LLP, Debtor's 11 Attorney, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$849,323.89, 12 expenses: \$0.00. filed by Arnold & Porter Kaye 13 Scholer LLP. (Boccanfuso, Anthony) (ECF #4116) 14 15 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 16 Sixth Interim Application of Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP for 17 Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 18 Expenses Incurred as Counsel to the Debtors and 19 Debtors in Possession for the Period of June 1, 2021 Through 20 September 30, 2021 for Davis Polk & Wardwell 21 LLP, Debtor's Attorney, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, 22 fee:\$38,805,548.0, expenses: \$433,221.43. filed by Davis Polk & Wardwell LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A -23 Certification of Compliance with Fee Guidelines # 2 24 25 Exhibit B - Retention Order # 3 Exhibit C - Professional and

Page 5 1 Paraprofessional Fees for Fee Period # 4 Exhibit D -2 Fees by Project Category for Fee Period # 5 Exhibit E -3 Budget and Staffing Plan for Fee Period # 6 Exhibit F -Expense Summary # 7 Exhibit G - Customary and Comparable 4 5 Compensation Disclosures for the Fee Period) 6 (Huebner, Marshall) (ECF #4119) 7 8 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 9 /Jones Day's Sixth Interim Application For Allowance of 10 Compensation For Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 11 Actual and Necessary Expenses Incurred During 12 Retention Period From June 1, 2021 Through September 30, 13 2021 for Jones Day, Special Counsel, period: 14 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$1,151,574.20, expenses: 15 \$91,270.27. filed by Jones Day. (ECF #4123) 16 17 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 18 / Sixth Joint Interim Fee Application of KPMG LLP as Tax 19 Consultant to the Debtors and the Official Committee of 20 Unsecured Creditors for Allowance of Compensation for 21 Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses for the 22 Period from June 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021 23 for Purdue Pharma L.P., Consultant, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$24,223.10, expenses: \$0.00. filed by 24 25 Purdue Pharma L.P. (ECF #3995)

Page 6 1 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 2 / Sixth Interim Fee Application of Ernst & Young LLP for Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred as 3 Auditors and Providers of Other Professional 4 5 Services for the Debtors for the Period from June 1, 2021 6 Through September 30, 2021 for Ernst & Young LLP, 7 Auditor, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$58000.00, expenses: \$1177.50. filed by Ernst & Young LLP. 8 9 (ECF #4114) 10 11 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 12 / Sixth Interim Fee Application of AlixPartners, LLP 13 Financial Advisor for the Chapter 11 Debtors, for Allowance 14 of Compensation for Professional Services 15 Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses for the Period June 16 1, 2021 Through September 30, 2021 for 17 AlixPartners, LLP, Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$4,009,435.00, expenses: \$194,217.02. 18 19 filed by AlixPartners, LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A -20 Detailed Description of AlixPartners' Fees and Hours 21 by Matter Category During the Sixth Interim Period # 2 22 Exhibit B - Summary and Detailed Description of AlixPartners' Expenses During Sixth Interim Period # 3 23 Exhibit C - Certification of Lisa Donahue) (ECF #4120) 24 25

Page 7 1 HEARING re Third Application for Interim Professional 2 Compensation of Prime Clerk LLC, as Administrative Advisor to the Debtors, for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 3 4 Expenses for the Period from June 1, 2021 through 5 September 30, 2021 for Prime Clerk LLC, Other Professional, 6 period: 7/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$623646.43, 7 expenses: \$273.50. filed by Prime Clerk LLC. (ECF #4115) 8 9 HEARING re Sixth Application for Interim Professional 10 Compensation Sixth Interim Fee Application Of Skadden, Arps, 11 Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP For Compensation For Services 12 Rendered And Reimbursement Of Expenses As Special 13 Counsel To The Debtors For The Period From June 1, 2021 14 Through And Including September 30, 2021 for Skadden, Arps, 15 Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, Debtor's Attorney, period: 16 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$3,436,000.65, expenses: 17 \$126,312.25. filed by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP. (ECF #4141) 18 19 20 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 21 / Sixth Interim Application of Kramer Levin Naftalis & 22 Frankel LLP, as Co-Counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental and Other Contingent Litigation 23 24 Claimants, for Allowance of Compensation for Professional 25 Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual

Page 8 1 and Necessary Expenses Incurred for the Period from June 1, 2 2021 through September 30, 2021 for Kramer Levin 3 Naftalis & Frankel LLP, Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$5,651,625.50, expenses: \$61,624.84. filed 4 5 by Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP. (ECF #4142) 6 7 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation / Sixth Interim Fee Application of PJT Partners LP as 8 9 Investment Banker to the Debtors and Debtors-In-Possession 10 for Allowance of Compensation for Services Rendered and for 11 the Reimbursement of All Actual and Necessary Expenses 12 Incurred for the Period of June 1, 2021 for PJT Partners LP, 13 Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, 14 fee:\$900,000.00, expenses: \$3,567.77. filed by PJT Partners 15 LP. (Attachments: # 1 Appendix A # 2 Appendix B # 3 Appendix 16 C) (ECF #4124) 17 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 18 / Fifth Interim Application of Cornerstone Research for 19 20 Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of 21 Expenses Incurred as Consultant to the Debtors for 22 the Period from June 1, 2021 Through September 30, 2021 for 23 Cornerstone Research, Consultant, period: 24 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$443,116.50, expenses: \$40.20. 25 filed by Cornerstone Research. (Attachments: # 1

Page 9 1 Exhibit A - Certification of Compliance with Fee Guidelines # 2 Exhibit B - Retention Order # 3 Exhibit C -2 Professional and Paraprofessional Fees for Fee Period # 4 3 Exhibit D - Fes by Category for Fee Period # 5 Exhibit 4 5 E - Staffing Plan for Fee Period # 6 Exhibit F - Expense 6 Summary # 7 Exhibit G - Customary and Comparable 7 Compensation Disclosures for the Fee Period) (ECF #4122) 8 First Application for Interim Professional Compensation for 9 Jeffrey R. Gleit, Special Counsel, period: 8/1/2021 to 10 9/30/2021, fee:\$467761.50, expenses: \$285.95. filed by 11 Jeffrey R. Gleit. (ECF #4113) 12 13 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 14 / First Interim Fee Application of Grant Thronton LLP for 15 Allowance of: (I) Compensation and Reimbursement of Expenses 16 Incurred for Retention as Consultants to Debtors for 17 Services Related to the Plan for the Period January 20, 2021 to September 30, 2021; and (II) Payments for Services 18 19 Performed in the Ordinary Course of Debtors' Business 20 Through September 30, 2021 for Grant Thornton LLP, Consultant, period: 1/20/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$192,710.50, 21 22 expenses: \$34,703.49. filed by Grant Thornton LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A - Certification of Raymond Werth 23 # 2 Exhibit B - Initial Retention Order and the Supplemental 24 25 Retention Order # 3 Exhibit C - Summary of Hourly Plan

Page 10 1 Services by Professional # 4 Exhibit D - Summary of Plan 2 Services by Category # 5 Exhibit Detailed Time Entries for 3 Plan Services by Category # 6 Exhibit F - Staffing Plan # 7 Exhibit G - Summary of Out of Pocket Expenses and 4 5 Supporting Invoices # 8 Exhibit H - Customary Comparable 6 Compensation Disclosures for the Fee Period # 9 7 Exhibit I - Summary and Supporting Invoices for OCB Tax 8 Services) (ECF #4121) 9 10 HEARING re Sixth Application for Interim Professional 11 Compensation /Sixth Interim Fee Application of Brown Rudnick 12 LLP as Co-Counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee of Governmental 13 and Other Contingent Litigation Claimants for 14 Services and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred for the 15 Period of June 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021 16 (Attachments: Exhibit A-F) for Brown Rudnick LLP, Other 17 Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, 18 fee:\$3,325,679.50, expenses: \$12,918.34. filed by Brown 19 Rudnick LLP. (ECF #4126) 20 21 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 22 / Sixth Interim Fee Application of FTI Consulting, Inc. for 23 Compensation Earned and Expenses Incurred for the Period 24 from June 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021 for 25 FTI Consulting, Inc., Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021

Page 11 1 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$1,264,175.50, expenses: \$156.75. 2 filed by FTI Consulting, Inc. (ECF #4129) 3 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 4 5 / Application of Otterbourg P.C. as Co-Counsel to the Ad Hoc 6 Committee of Governmental and Other Contingent Claimants for 7 Sixth Interim Allowance of Compensation for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred from June 1, 8 9 2021 Through and Including September 30, 2021 for Otterbourg 10 P.C., Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, 11 fee:\$601,312.00, expenses: \$47.49. filed by Otterbourg P.C. 12 (ECF #4127) 13 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 14 15 / Sixth Interim Application for Allowance of Compensation 16 for Services Rendered and Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred 17 by Gilbert LLP as Co-Counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee of 18 Governmental and Other Contingent Litigation Claimants for the Period June 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021 for 19 20 Gilbert LLP, Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 21 9/30/2021, fee:\$2,766,720.00, expenses: \$56,440.83. filed by 22 Gilbert LLP. (ECF #4128) 23 24 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 25 / Sixth Interim Application of Kramer Levin Naftalis &

Page 12 1 Frankel LLP, as Co-Counsel to the Ad Hoc Committee of 2 Governmental and Other Contingent Litigation Claimants, for 3 Allowance of Compensation for Professional Services Rendered and for Reimbursement of Actual and Necessary Expenses 4 5 Incurred for the Period from June 1, 2021 through September 6 30, 2021 for Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP, Other 7 Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$5,651,625.50, expenses: \$61,624.84. filed by Kramer 8 Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP. (ECF #4142) 9 10 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 11 12 / Fifth Interim Fee Application of Houlihan Lokey Capital, 13 Inc., Investment Banker and Co-Financial Advisor to the Ad 14 Hoc Committee, for Compensation and 15 Reimbursement of Expenses for the Period from June 1, 2021 16 through September 30, 2021 for Houlihan Lokey 17 Capital, Inc., Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$800,000.00, expenses: \$3,223.71. filed by 18 19 Houlihan Lokey Capital, Inc. (ECF #4132) 20 21 HEARING re Interim Application for Interim Professional 22 Compensation / Second Interim Application of Caplin & 23 Drysdale, Chartered, for Allowance of Compensation and 24 Reimbursement of Expenses With Respect to Services Rendered 25 as Counsel to the Multi-State Governmental Entities Group

Page 13 1 for the Period Commencing June 1, 2021, through 2 September 30, 2021 for Multi-State Governmental Entities 3 Group, Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 9/30/2021, fee:\$1,709,854.00, expenses: \$26,355.44. filed by 4 5 Multi-State Governmental Entities Group. (Maclay, 6 Kevin) (ECF #4145) 7 8 HEARING re Fifth Application for Interim Professional 9 Compensation -- Fifth Interim Application of Bielli & 10 Klauder, LLC for Compensation for Services Rendered and 11 Reimbursement of Expenses Incurred as Counsel to the Fee 12 Examiner, David M. Klauder, Esquire, for the Period from 13 June 1, 2021 through September 30, 2021 -- for Bielli 14 & Klauder, LLC, Other Professional, period: 6/1/2021 to 15 9/30/2021, fee:\$220,000.00, expenses: \$. filed by Bielli 16 & Klauder, LLC. (Bielli, Thomas) (ECF #4118) 17 HEARING re Application for Interim Professional Compensation 18 as an Ordinary Course Professional for Compensation for 19 20 Services Rendered in Excess of the Tier 1 OCP Cap for Reed 21 Smith LLP, Other Professional, period: 5/1/2021 to 22 8/31/2021, fee:\$485,527.25, expenses: \$0.00. filed by Reed Smith LLP. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit A # 2 Exhibit 23 24 B # 3 Exhibit C # 4 Exhibit D # 5 Exhibit E) (Breene, Paul) (ECF #4090) 25

Page 14 1 HEARING re Notice of Hearing on the Application of Reed 2 Smith LLP as an Ordinary Course Professional for Compensation for Services Rendered in Excess of the Tier 1 3 4 OCP CAP for the Period from May 1, 2021 through August 31, 5 2021 (related document(s)4090) filed by Paul E. Breene on 6 behalf of Reed Smith LLP. (ECF #4091) 7 8 HEARING re Certificate of No Objection Pursuant to LR 9075-2 9 CERTIFICATE OF NO OBJECTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1746 REGARDING 10 THE APPLICATION OF REED SMITH LLP AS AN ORDINARY COURSE 11 PROFESSIONAL FOR COMPENSATION FOR SERVICES RENDERED IN EXCESS OF THE TIER 1 OCP CAP FOR THE PERIOD FROM MAY 1,2021 12 THROUGH AUGUST 31, 2021 (related document(s)4090) Filed 13 by Paul E. Breene on behalf of Purdue Pharma L.P. 14 15 (ECF #4218) 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 Transcribed by: Sonya Ledanski Hyde 25


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1	APPEARANCES:	
2		
3	DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP	
4	Attorneys for the Debtor	
5	450 Lexington Avenue	
6	New York, NY 10017	
7		
8	BY: MARSHALL S. HUEBNER (TELEPHONICALLY)	
9	JACQUELYN SWANNER KNUDSON (TELEPHONICALLY)	
10		
11	SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP	
12	Attorneys for Skadden Arps Slate Meagher Flom LLP	
13	4 Times Square	
14	New York, NY 10036	
15		
16	BY: ANTHONY W. CLARK (TELEPHONICALLY)	
17		
18	ALSO PRESENT TELEPHONICALLY:	
19		
20	JUSTIN R. ALBERTO	
21	ROXANA ALEALI	
22	ANDREW VINCENT ALFANO	
23	MICHAEL ATKINSON	
24	JASMINE BALL	
25	BROOKS BARKER	

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1	KATHRYN BENEDICT	
2	THOMAS D. BIELLI	
3	SHEILA BIRNBAUM	
4	DAVID E. BLABEY	
5	SARA BRAUNER	
6	GABRIEL BRUNSWICK	
7	GERARD CICERO	
8	ANTHONY W. CLARK	
9	HAYDEN COLEMAN	
10	DYLAN CONSLA	
11	MARIO D'ANGELO	
12	SCOTT DAVISON	
13	KEVIN DAVIS	
14	JESSE DELACONTE	
15	CLINT DOCKEN	
16	MARIA ECKE	
17	KENNETH H. ECKSTEIN	
18	BRIAN EDMUNDS	
19	BERNARD ARDAVAN ESKANDARI	
20	MATTHEW FARRELL	
21	JENNIFER S. FEENEY	
22	LAWRENCE FOGELMAN	
23	CAROLINE GANGE	
24	MAGALI GIDDENS	
25	JEFFREY R. GLEIT	

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1	SARAH HARBUCK	
2	MITCHELL HURLEY	
3	ELLEN ISAACS	
4	HAROLD D. ISRAEL	
5	EVAN M. JONES	
6	GREGORY JOSEPH	
7	BENJAMIN S. KAMINETZKY	
8	MARC KESSELMAN	
9	DAVID KLAUDER	
10	DARREN S. KLEIN	
11	ANNA KORDAS	
12	ANN KRAMER	
13	IAN S. LANDSBERG	
14	ANN LANGLEY	
15	ALEXANDER LEES	
16	MARA LEVENTHAL	
17	JEFFREY LIESEMER	
18	KEVIN MACLAY	
19	GERARD MCCARTHY	
20	JAMES I. MCCLAMMY	
21	SHANNON M. MCNULTY	
22	NATHANIEL MILLER	
23	MAURA KATHLEEN MONAGHAN	
24	AISLING MURRAY	
25	ENRIQUE NIEVES	

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1	MICHAEL PATRICK O'NEIL
2	
	SUSAN OUSTERMAN
3	STEVEN POHL
4	ARIK PREIS
5	KAMI ELIZABETH QUINN
6	LINDA RIFFKIN
7	RACHAEL RINGER
8	CHRISTOPHER ROBERTSON
9	JEFFREY J. ROSEN
10	HEATHER SAYDAH
11	ELIZABETH SCHLECKER
12	PAUL KENAN SCHWARTZBERG
13	LUCAS H. SELF
14	J. CHRISTOPHER SHORE
15	MARC F. SKAPOF
16	LAURA SMITH
17	KATE SOMERS
18	ROBIN SPIGEL
19	ETHAN STERN
20	ERIC STODOLA
21	MARC JOSEPH TOBAK
22	ESTHER TOWNES
23	ALICE TSIER
24	ALLEN J. UNDERWOOD
25	GERARD UZZI

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1	SHMUEL VASSER	
2	MICHAEL J. VENDITTO	
3	ELI J. VONNEGUT	
4	JORDAN A. WEBER	
5	JAMES P. WEHNER	
6	ALLISON H. WEISS	
7	THEODORE WELLS	
8	IRVE GOLDMAN	
9	RICHARD ARCHER	
10	TZERINA DIZON	
11	LOWELL W. FINSON	
12	MICHAEL D. GOFORTH	
13	UDAY GORREPATI	
14	BRIAN HANSEN	
15	M. NATASHA LABOVITZ	
16	KAREN LEUNG	
17	SIDNEY P. LEVINSON	
18	MICHELE MEISES	
19	MARCIA R. MEOLI	
20	NICHOLAS PREY	
21	JACOB W. STAHL	
22	VINCE SULLIVAN	
23	WENDY WEINBERG	
24	KATIE M. WHITE	
25	MARY JO WHITE	



PROCEEDINGS

THE COURT: Okay. Good morning. This is Judge
Drain. We're here in In Re Purdue Pharma LP et al. on a
regular monthly omnibus calendar.

I have the agenda for today's hearing submitted and filed by counsel for the Debtors and I'm prepared to go down that agenda in order.

8 MR. HUEBNER: Thank you very much, Your Honor.
9 Can I be heard clearly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HUEBNER: Okay. For the record, Your Honor,
Marshall Huebner on behalf of the Debtors.

There are three contested matters that we put on.

The first will be handled in just a moment by my colleague

Jacquelyn Knudson. There are obviously uncontested matters

and I'll be reporting when we get to that, but resolutions

have been reached with the fee examiner on every single

application, which hopefully will be very good news to the

Court. One other just precatory note, as the Court may or

may not be aware, in a ruling that Judge McMahon handed down

on a subsidiary issue raised on appeal last week, she did

indicate that her decision would be forthcoming this week.

So given that it is Thursday, we, of course, have no idea

what the content of that decision will be and the timing

could change, there is at least a nontrivial possibility or

more that decision will be handed down either today or tomorrow. And obviously, we will have to figure out where we go from there based on that ruling.

We don't really have anything else in the way of sort of an omnibus or status report. So unless the Court has questions for me, I will turn the virtual podium over to Ms. Knudson.

THE COURT: Okay, very well. Thank you.

MS. KNUDSON: Good morning, Your Honor. For the record, Jacquelyn Knudson of Davis Polk and Wardell on behalf of the Debtors. Can I be heard clearly?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. KNUDSON: Thank you, Your Honor. So the first item on the agenda is Ms. Isaacs motion to object -- motion to object to payments for all parties and other relief, which is at Docket No. 3963. I will turn the podium over to Ms. Isaacs. I believe she is on, if she would like to be heard first as the movant.

THE COURT: Okay. I have reviewed this motion and the Debtors objection to it. I actually don't need oral argument on the motion. The motion seeks relief that has already been sought at least once, and in some cases twice, from this Court. Moreover, most, if not all, of the relief sought goes to issues that are presently on appeal, including an appeal by the movant here, Ms. Isaacs. To the

extent that the motion seeks relief from prior -- those prior orders of the Court, the first of which was entered on September 15, 2021, and the second of which was entered on November 22, 2021, the motion requests relief under either Bankruptcy Rule 9023, incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, or Bankruptcy Rule 9024, incorporating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

The Court, by Local Rule 9023-1 and 9023 -- I'm sorry, 9023-1, would only hear oral argument if the Court specifically orders that the matter be reargued orally. See also In Re Terrestar -- T-E-R-R-E-S-T-A-R -- Corporation, 2016 WL 197621, Bankruptcy SDNY January 15, 2016. Those prior orders as I noted quite clearly, especially the November, 22, 2021 order, dealt with requests for essentially the same relief sought in this motion, which was filed October 13, 2021 which Ms. Isaacs objects to any and all payments or compensation to anyone in these proceedings until the claimants and all victims across the nation receive proper due process, reasonable and just compensation for the wrongful deaths and effective financial compensation to provide adequate mental and physical health care services life. That's the caption of the motion.

The motion seeks seven forms of relief which were also sought in the motion filed October 1, 2021, dated September 30, 2021, that I dealt with in the November 22,

2021 order denying that motion. And much of the same relief, as far as an injunction of all payments and all activity in the case was sought, in addition in Ms. Isaacs motion for an immediate injunction and hearing for due process, production, and evidentiary documents and other relief dated August 16, 2021, and filed August 17, 2021, which I denied in an order dated September 15, 2021. I've already given the reasons for those denials in prior bench rulings and the motion here does not satisfy the requirements of either Rule 59 or Rule 60 for relief from those orders to the extent that I'm not divested of jurisdiction by the pending appeal of the confirmation order.

The burden of proof on a movant for relief under Rules 59 or 60 is exceptional in that such relief is viewed as extraordinary relief and not a substitute for an appeal. See, for example, US v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 247 F.3d. 370, 391 (2d Cir. 2001) and Nemaizer - N-E-M-A-I-Z-E-R - v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61, (2d Cir. 1986).

The Rule 59 motion to the extent -- I'm treating as a Rule 59 motion, and again, Ms. Isaacs is pro se, so it doesn't actually specify in the motion the basis, the legal basis for the relief under Rule 59, but I couched it potentially as one -- did not point to controlling decisions or data that the Court overlooked in its prior rulings. See

In Re Kirwan Offices S.A.R.L., 792 Fed Appx 99, 104 (2d Cir. 2019) citing Tonga -- I'm sorry -- Analytical Survey, Inc. v. Tonga Partners, LP, 684 F.3d 36, 52 (2d Cir. 2012), including not only for that proposition but also for the proposition that a motion for reconsideration is not a vehicle for presenting the Court -- or presenting the case under new theories or otherwise taking a second bite at the apple.

Similarly, the motion does not satisfy any of the six enumerated grounds for relief under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, again not citing any newly discovered evidence and really seeking to reargue points that the Court already considered. See generally In Re Terrestar Corp, 2016 WL 19762 (Bankruptcy SDNY January 15, 2016).

Again, I'm ruling on the papers here because the papers are clear on these points and I've already dealt with these matters. And as I noted, under the local rules, a hearing should be scheduled for oral argument on this only if the Court so directs and I didn't direct this. It's possible the clerk's office put it on the agenda not understanding the nature of these motions. But in any event, a hearing is not necessary. Again, see In Re Prudential Lines, Inc., 170 BR 222 (Bankruptcy SDNY 1994) and Local Rule 9023-1.

Moreover, as I noted, as set forth in the Prudential Lines case, it's well established that a pending appeal divests the lower court of its control over matters on the appeal, 170 BR at 243 and the case is cited therein including Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 US 373 (1985). This is also clear under Bankruptcy Rule 8008 and 8007, which the latter rule pertains to requests for stays pending appeal. At this point, the Court already having ruled on requests for stay pending appeal and the District Court also having ruled, if there is to be any further stay, and one can read this motion as requesting a stay as set forth in the initial paragraphs of the motion, that should be determined by the District Court on proper motion to the District Court, presumably if the District Court does not reverse or remand the appeal presently before it. So I'll ask the Debtors to submit an order denying the motion of those two alternative grounds. MS. ISAACS: Your Honor, may I ask a question please? THE COURT: Sure. MS. ISAACS: If I haven't met the heavy burden of proof to save humanity, what else is there? THE COURT: I can't begin to answer that question, Ms. Issacs, other than pointing to the law that I've already

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cited to.

MS. ISAACS: Then I have a second question.

THE COURT: You have that -- Ms. Isaacs, you have that issue on appeal and I can't, under the procedural and jurisdictional limitations, given that you have issue on appeal, decide it. It's on appeal. I've also ruled on the aspects of your motion that arguably don't cover the plan that's on appeal. So --

MS. ISAACS: So then I have a second question,
Your Honor. This is outside the scope of anything we've
ever seen in all of humanity and there are no laws that can
govern what's going on. So where does anybody turn from
there because no attorney or attorney general knows what to
do in this matter.

THE COURT: Well, I think they would differ with you, ma'am and we'll leave it at that. And if you don't believe the laws apply, then I don't know why you're filing in court.

MS. ISAACS: Because justice needs to be served,
Your Honor.

THE COURT: All right, very well. I'm going to move onto the next two matters on the agenda, both of which seek leaves to file proofs of claim after the bar date that was established in this case.

The first is a motion by Robert Caulk, C-A-U-L-K.

And the second is a motion by Lamere Wilmer-Williamson. The Debtors objected to both of those motions in a joint objection, which I have reviewed, as well as, of course, the two motions.

I don't know, is either Mr. Caulk or Lamere
Wilmer-Williamson on the phone? Okay. Ms. Knudson, have
there been any further developments on these motions?

MS. KNUDSON: No, Your Honor, there is not. We did, on December 2nd, send out letters to both of the movants requesting additional information because as of now, we do not think with the information provided that they have met the excusable neglect standards set forth in Bankruptcy Rule 9006 and the so-called Pioneer Factors. We have not received responses from the movants and they have not provided additional information.

Because of that, we request the Court to deny the motions without prejudice so that the movants can properly submit evidence describing the reason for the delay and demonstrating that timely filing of claim was outside of their control. As Your Honor is aware, that is the most important factor, most important Pioneer factor, that being the reason for the delay. And in the short motions provided by both of the movants, neither of them have provided any reason why they could not timely file a proof of claim.

The Debtors do acknowledge that both of the

movants are incarcerated, however, their papers do not state they were incarcerated prior to the July 30, 2020 bar date.

Nor do they allege that their incarcerate prevented them from timely filing a proof of claim.

The other thing that we would note, Your Honor, is that the delay here has been substantial with the motion filed over 15 months after the bar date and over six weeks after this Court confirmed the Debtor's plan.

So with respect to the request to file late claims, we would request the Court deny the motions without prejudice.

Mr. Caulk's motion, as I'm sure you know, also requested additional relief and that relief being that we provide additional notice to incarcerated individuals that can demonstrate opioid addiction. We believe this request should also be denied. The motion provided -- the notice provided in these cases has been extraordinary. Moreover, as the Debtors have shown, we have been willing to consider and allow late claims based on individualized assertions and the Debtors' Plan provides mechanisms to do the same. So with respect to that relief, we would request that be denied as well.

THE COURT: Okay. I'm sorry. You said that letter was sent to each of the movants on December 2nd or 3rd? I want to make sure I heard that correctly.

Pg 30 of 52 Page 30 1 MS. KNUDSON: Yes, Your Honor, December 2nd. 2 THE COURT: Okay. And how did they get notice of 3 today's hearing? MS. KNUDSON: In that same letter, we let them 4 5 know their motions would be heard on December 16th at 10 6 a.m. 7 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Okay, I, as I've said, have two motions before me for leave to file a claim 8 late after the July 30, 2020, bar date set in this case for 9 10 filing claims, each of which has been objected to by the 11 Debtors, although the Debtors' objection states that the 12 Debtors are amenable to receiving additional information 13 regarding the circumstances behind the late filing of both 14 claims. The first motion on the calendar is a motion by 15 16 Robert Caulk, C-A-U-L-K, and the second is a motion by 17 Lamere Wilmer-Williamson. Both movants are pro se and both 18 motions, which are in the same handwriting, are dated October 31, 2021, well over a year after the bar date was 19 20 set in these cases, again, that bar date being July 30, 21 2020. 22 I will also note that the Court entered an order 23 confirming the Chapter 11 Plan in these cases on September

17, 2021, approximately six weeks before both of these

motions were made.

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Each motion states that the movant is incarcerated and each motion states that the claimant believes that the claimant has a claim based on the addictive nature of the Debtors' product, which I'm assuming refers to Oxy-Contin and the growing science establishing toxicity of that product.

Mr. Caulk's motion also makes a general request to extend notice, additional notice to people who are incarcerated. Importantly, neither motion states a specific set of facts as to why the movant would not have been able to file a timely request or a motion earlier than October 31, such as, for example, the unusual lockdowns that occurred during the COVID epidemic at times that would prevent people who are incarcerated from obtaining mailed notices or being in common areas to see broadcasts or listen to broadcasts, which is an important omission and as the Debtors' objection points out, distinguishes these motions from prior motions that the Court has granted largely in number by those who were incarcerated, but which showed that they had not, during the period when there was notice of the bar date, been able to obtain such notice.

The burden of proof in a motion like these, which are governed by Bankruptcy Rule 9006(b)(1) which provides for an extension of the deadline to file a proof of claim if the familiar to submit the claim timely was due to excusable

neglect and the Supreme Court's case, Pioneer Investment
Services Company v. Brunswick Associates Limited

Partnership, 507 US 380 (1993), which interpreted that rule
and the term "excusable neglect" and provided factors for
the Court to analyze on a case-by-base basis. See also

Midland Cogeneration Venture, LP v. Enron Corp (In Re Enron
Corp) 419 F.3d 115, 121 (2d Cir. 2005) as to the burden of
proof.

Before turning to an analysis of those factors, it's important to note that as recently stated by the Third Circuit "dates matter in bankruptcy. For Creditors, none is more important than the bar date, a deadline set by the bankruptcy court for them to file claims against or request for payment from the debtor. The bar date interacts with the Chapter 11 Plan of reorganization., LS v. Westinghouse Electric Company, 11 F.4th 221, 226 (3d Cir. 2021).

Thus the bar date serves the important purpose of enabling the parties and interests to ascertain with reasonable promptness the identity of those making claims against the estate and the general amount of the claims, a necessary step in achieving the goal of successful reorganization, In Re Calpine Corp, 2007 US District Lexis 86514, Pages 14 through 15 (SDNY November 21, 2007). See also In Re Asia Global Crossing Limited, 324 BR 503, 508, (Bankruptcy SDNY 2005).

Allowing late final claims, especially after a Debtors' Plan is confirmed, subjects the Debtor to prejudice because -- to additional prejudice because it would have to renegotiate any settlements reached in contemplation of the known claims against the estate, In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc., 148 BR 1002, 1008-10 (Bankruptcy SDNY 1993).

The Supreme Court in the Pioneer case that I previously cited developed a two-step test for determining whether a claim filed after the bar date was due to excusable neglect and, therefore, should be recognized by the Court. First the movant must show that its failure to file a timely claim constituted neglect as opposed to willfulness or a knowing omission. Neglect generally being attributed to a movant's inadvertent mistake or carelessness, 507 US, 387-88. After establishing neglect, the Court needs to decide whether that neglect was excusable. That analysis is to be undertaken on a case-bycase basis that is based on the particular facts of the case, although the Court is to be guided by and make the determination balancing the following factors: 1) the danger of prejudice to the Debtor, 2) the length of the delay and whether or not it would impact the case, 3) the reason for the delay, in particular, whether the delay was within the control of the movant, and 4) whether the movant acted in

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good faith. ID at 395.

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However, inadvertence, ignorance of the rules or mistakes construing the rules do not usually constitute excusable neglect, In Re Enron Corp 419 F.3d 126.

In that decision, the court stated -- that is the Second Circuit stated -- we have taken a hard line in applying the Pioneer test. In a typical case, three of the Pioneer factors: the length of the delay, the danger of prejudice, and the movant's good faith, usually weigh in favor of the party seeking the extension. We noted, though, that we and other circuits have focused on the third factor, the reason for the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant. And we caution that the equities will rarely, if ever, favor a party who fails to follow the clear dictates of the court rule and that where the rule is entirely clear, we continue to expect that a party claiming excusable neglect will, in the ordinary course, lose under the Pioneer test, ID at 366-67, internal quotations and citations omitted. See also In Re DPH Holdings Corp, 434 BR 77, 82 (SDNY 2010) and In Re Musicland Holding Corp, 2006 Bankruptcy Lexis 3315 at Pages 10-11, (Bankruptcy SDNY 2006).

Here, as I've noted, the reason for the delay is not detailed here and the inference that I'm being asked to make by these pleadings that the mere incarceration of these

two movants is enough of a reason for their delay is too much of a stretch given the extensive notice that was provided and the fact that many incarcerated people did, in fact, file proofs of claim in this case. More factual background would need to be submitted to establish that the reason for the delay was not within the reasonable control of either of the movants.

Here, also, the delay is quite lengthy. The courts have generally recognized that delay between the bar date and the filing of the claim or the motion in excess of a year is significant. See, for example, In Re Enron Creditors Recovery Corp, 370 BR 90, 103 (Bankruptcy SDNY 2007), which was a 15-month delay, similar to this one and In Re Cable & Wireless USA, Inc., 338 BR 609, 616, (Bankruptcy D. Delaware 2006), where a one-year delay was significant.

Moreover, if one permitted simply the fact of incarceration to justify the late filing of a claim, I believe that would, in fact, open the door to too great a number of other claims being filed late, a factor that courts have often cited as establishing prejudice against the debtor and the creditors who have relied on the bar date to flag the claims against the estate, see, again, In Re DPH Holdings, 434, BR at 82 and In Re Lehman Brothers Holding Inc., 433 BR 113, 120-21(Bankruptcy SDNY 2014).

Finally, as I noted, these motions were filed six weeks after the order confirming the Debtors' Plan was entered. And that fact also is important here as I previously noted, allowing claims after the plan was filed would be additional prejudice given that the plan was negotiated and confirmed in large part on an assumption regarding the allowable claims against the Debtor's estate in additional to In Re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group Inc, which I previously cited, 148 BR, 1008-10, see In Re Enron Corp, 419 F.3d at 128, and DPH Holdings 434 BR at 82.

So, for those reasons, I'll deny both motions' request to file the claim late. I'm not going to specifically say it's denied without prejudice, however, the movants can seek relief from this order base on new facts if, for some reason, such relief is warranted under Rule 59 or Rule 60.

That leaves me to the portion of the motion that seeks additional notice for incarcerated people. The Court, as I noted, entered the bar date order in the late spring of 2020. It provided for extensive, in fact, unprecedented notice, including procedures specifically geared to reach incarcerated people. It has obviously been more than a year since that ordered was entered, so I should consider this request in the motion as a request for relieve under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b), but it doesn't satisfy the

test for such relief, which is extraordinary relief, that the motion fails to set forth facts in its support in establishing any of the factors laid out in 60(b), i.e. mistake and inadvertent surprise, or excusable neglect, newly discovered evidence that with reasonable diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial, fraud, misrepresentation or misconduct by an opposing party in respect of obtaining the order, that the judgment itself is void, that the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged. It is based on earlier judgment that has bene reversed or vacated or applying it prospectively is no longer equitable, or seeks any other reason that justifies relief. Again, none of those factors is laid out or supported here to sustain the high burden of a Rule 60 motion. See generally In Re Terrestar Corp, 2016 WL 197621 at Page 3 (Bankruptcy SDNY January 15, 2016) and the cases cited therein. So I will ask Ms. Knudson to email an order -separate orders, on both of these motions denying the relief requested. MS. KNUDSON: Thank you, Your Honor, will do so. THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, that brings us to the uncontested portion of the agenda as I alluded to briefly at

the beginning. I'm happy to report that the fee examiner

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has reached resolutions on everything on this part of the There are two different subgroups. On is, in agenda. essence, the holdbacks for the quarterly fee applications that has been in the quarterly period through must of 2021. The second is an application for Reed Smith, which began the case as an ordinary course professional, but because, as the Court knows, insurance matters are very material and a very serious asset of the estate, they exceeded the ordinary course caps and therefore, pursuant to the procedures approved by the Court over two years ago, we needed to move separately for the payments in excess of the cap. There as well, the fee examiner essentially treated that application as one that required review, went through it, you know, raised questions, as I think he did with all professionals, and ultimately reached an accommodation as we had done on each of the prior quarterly holdback hearings.

Davis Polk is pretty much done and I think the

Court can have in an hour or two or three with a single

omnibus order that clearly reflects the reductions agreed to

and the net amounts to be paid to all of the UCC

professionals, MSGE professionals, Ad Hoc Committee

professionals and Debtor professionals as the Court, of

course, knows, the Debtors agreed in various settlements and

motions over the course of the cases to pay the fees of a

large subset of our Creditor world and so that's what many

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of these applications are for, with the balance being the Debtors.

So, unless the Court has any questions, we would proport to send that in. The one request I guess I would make on behalf of everybody is that it is obviously important for accounting and recognition and other purposes, you know, for people to be tried to be paid well before year-end for things that were well into 2021. So, the Court would be able to potentially enter the order if that meets the Court's please and the Court has no further question, that would obviously facilitate that result, especially in the upcoming holiday season, you know, vacations and the like on the client's side.

THE COURT: Okay. I do have a couple of questions. First, when you say that each of these applications reflects the -- or the relief being sought in respect to each of these applications reflects agreements between the applicant the fee examiner, or the review of the fee examiner, are those agreements already in the applications or are there further adjustments from what was in the applications?

MR. HUEBNER: Apologizes, Your Honor, if I was not clear. Those are not yet visible to the Court. Those are agreements that were reached in the last several days as the fee examiner has been working through them furiously to, you

know, finish out his conversations with each professional. So, as I think as has been the case each quarter, we'll have an omnibus order that shows the amount of reduction for each firm off of the applications that are presently in front of the Court. So, while many firms, certainly Davis Polk included, took material voluntary sort of self-done reductions prior to even filing the applications, there are further reductions agreed to with the fee examiner that would be reflected in the omnibus grid order that we would submit to the Court later today. THE COURT: Okay. All right. I have some specific questions too and I may need to hear from the fee examiner or his counsel on this as to whether those issues were taken into account in the negotiations or that led up to the agreed reductions. So I'll go through those first and then I have a couple of other observations to make. First, the Jones Day applications, which is primarily IP and patent litigation, there's a fairly large expense, over \$87,000, for "consultant fees." I don't really have any background or support for what that is and I don't know whether the fee examiner looked at that and was satisfied that that was an appropriate expense.

Klauder, the fee examiner. Can you hear me okay?

MR. KLAUDER: Good morning, Your Honor. David

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Pq 41 of 52 Page 41 1 THE COURT: Yes. 2 MR. KLAUDER: Good morning. A pleasure to be in 3 front of you. That was a specific expense that we asked for and requested backup for and Jones Day did provide us the 4 5 invoice and the explanations with respect to that. My 6 understanding is that's a consultant related to some IP work 7 they were doing. So we did get the specific backup for 8 that. 9 THE COURT: Okay. And you were satisfied that was 10 a legitimate expense? 11 MR. KLAUDER: Yes. 12 THE COURT: Okay. I had a somewhat similar 13 question about an expense on the Skadden Arps application, 14 \$120,000 expense for "secondment" of Skadden attorney. Did 15 you look at that one? 16 MR. KLAUDER: We did look at that one. 17 actually has come up in previous applications and I can leave it to Skadden to sort of explain what that is if Your 18 19 Honor is looking for a little bit more explanation. We did 20 ask for backup and we did get the backup and we were 21 satisfied with the backup and the explanation for that 22 expense. THE COURT: Well I think I do need to understand. 23 24 I have no idea what means actually, so I should either hear

from you or from someone on Skadden on that one.

MR. CLARK: Your Honor, it's Tony Clark from Skadden Arps. My understanding is that at the request of the client, the Debtors, Purdue, one of our associates has been on secondment assignment for longer than this interim application period. I can't tell you exactly what it was, but as much as six or eight months. And the agreement was that we would keep him on our payroll at a much higher rate and be reimbursed \$30,000 a month which does not cover all of our costs for the services of that particular associate who is still there. THE COURT: Okay. So he's essentially working full time as an inhouse legal person although still on Skadden's payroll? MR. CLARK: That's my understanding, yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you. There's a similar -- you can get the theme of these questions. There's a similar expense item -- I'm not sure whether this is -- well, on the Akin Gump application, there is a 107,000 plus expense billed as "Professional fees, legal." I wasn't sure what that was and wanted to know whether the examiner looked at that one. MR. KLAUDER: Your Honor, that is something we did look at and got the backup for. I'm trying to -- perhaps Akin Gump can pop in to give you a little bit more

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explanation. I'll check my records to give you some, but I know we specifically requested that and received that backup and were satisfied with that.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. BRAUNER: Good morning, Your Honor. Sara
Brauner, Akin Gump, on behalf of the Committee. That is
correct. We did, in fact, provide the backup. It relates
exclusively to Trust Point, which is a document and
discovery vendor and hosting vendor that we had worked with
over the course of the investigation, and it relates to not
only document storage, but also certain machine learning to
conduct initial levels of document review.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. That's fine. Thank you. And then last on these types of comments, for Gilbert, there is an expense item for "Contracted Professional Fees" of \$45,000 and change. Is that a similar document company or is that something else? I don't know if anyone is on for Gilbert or if the fee examiner's counsel can shed some light on that one.

MR. KLAUDER: Your Honor, I'm sorry. We did -I'm just pulling up my report on that. This was for a -- I
guess Gilbert, on behalf of the AHC, this was an expert
witness that the used at the confirmation hearing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. KLAUDER: And now that I'm looking, I did get

the specific invoice for that particular person, the billings that were incorporated in the application and as a result of that explanation and the backup, I was satisfied.

THE COURT: All right. So it's the expert witness's fee and it's consistent with the fee agreement that was disclosed by the expert witness.

MR. KLAUDER: Right, yes.

THE COURT: All right, thanks. Okay. Those are my specific questions.

Obviously, these fee applications involve a lot of professional services for a lot of money. At the same time, this period in these cases was one that called for a significant amount of sophisticated professional services and those services were not limited to the issues in the bankruptcy case, which were many, but also complex representations involving the Debtors' underlying businesses, which are heavily regulated and involve both past and present regulatory issues as well as intellectual property and patent-related services.

The standard for reviewing fee applications is largely set forth in Section 330 of the Code and is then the subject of a fair amount of case law as well, which focuses largely on Congress's decision to provide for compensation in bankruptcy cases based on the value of the professional services in the market, so that if the retention has been

authorized by the Court with prior disclosure of the professional's compensation, one generally presumes that the staffing and other practical decisions made by those professionals have been made in good faith in view of the attorney's legal and ethical responsibilities.

However, just as the market has competitive pricing considerations that force non-bankruptcy professionals to review their bills for charges that should be reduced, the state compensated professionals need to exercise billing judgment and if they've not done so, the Court should do so when reviewing their fee applications.

In doing that, and given the experience of bankruptcy courts in reviewing many fee applications, which is recognized by the Circuits, bankruptcy courts enjoy wide discretion in determining reasonable fee awards.

Here, in addition to my own review, it's clear there has been review by the Court-appointed fee examiner. What I don't have is what the actual reductions are and that leaves me in a bit of a bind. I'm being asked to simply accept the agreements reached with the fee examiner. Those agreements may be perfectly appropriate. I have no reason to think they aren't, but I have my own separate obligation to review the fees.

On the other hand, however, these are all interim applications by firms as a whole that because of their

expertise and quality, have the ability to pay money back if for some reason I think on a final basis that should happen. So weighing all of that, I will review the proposed order and the proposed agreements in the context of interim applications only and decide whether, even on an interim basis, there should be further reductions or, instead, I should enter the order.

As far as the case authority, in addition to Section 330, I was quoting in large part from In Re Cenargo International PLC, 294 BR 571 (Bankruptcy SDNY 2003) and the cases cited therein.

So I think what I will say only here beyond what I've already said is that I assume that the fee examiner if focusing on these issues, but I want to make sure that that is the case and fully reserve my ability, if it wasn't the case, to focus on them at the time of final fee applications for the whole case. They primarily go, if not exclusively, to issues of potential duplication. And that flows in a couple of ways. First, with the Debtors professionals, it's conceivable to me that a fair amount of the work done by Dechert could overlap with work undertaken by Davis Polk. And I hope and trust that the fee examiner has looked into that issue and confirmed satisfactorily that there were clear lines of authority and communication so that duplication would be avoided.

Secondly, I somewhat more confident on this
because I think it's more subject to discreet task billing,
but the Debtors do have at least a couple of firms, Jones
Day and Arnold and Porter, working intellectual property
matters and I want to make sure that there isn't duplication
of effort there.

It is also conceivable to me that some of the Skadden work related to "bankruptcy related litigation" might be unnecessarily duplicative work by either the Debtors' main counsel, Davis Polk, or Dechert.

Similar concerns arise with respect to the law firms for the Ad Hoc Committee of governmental and other contingent litigation claimants' counsel. And again, my focus here is avoiding unnecessary duplication.

And then separate from that, and yet an important issue, is the need to focus on duplication within the firm.

For example, is it really necessary for Attorneys X, Y, and Z in addition to Attorneys A, B, and C to attend the confirmation hearing? These are things I assume that Mr.

Herner is focused on with his professionals but I'm going to make sure of that, which is why I'm raising that again. And obviously, it's not just limited to the confirmation, but that's just an example.

Lastly, and again, as Mr. Huebner said, we're in a bit of a holding pattern here awaiting the District Court's

ruling on the appeals from the confirmation order, I want to focus on the following.

A number of the financial advisors here depending on how that ruling goes, should be considering, and their clients should be considering with them, whether there should be a reduction of their services going forward.

That's primarily important for people or firms that are being compensated on a monthly basis, a monthly fee basis, but generally speaking, at a certain stage in a Chapter 11 case, while the financial professionals are really important at earlier stages, their work drops off.

So those are my observations. I don't know if anyone has anything further to say on them, but, again, my inclination is in all likelihood, that I will grant these applications as revised subject to my review of course of the discounts that have been agreed to and importantly, the reservation that all of the applications, as well as all the prior applications, are subject to review at the time of final fee applications.

MR. HUEBNER: Your Honor, it's Marshall Huebner.

Thank you from this end. Just two quick notes since it's not really a today issue based on Your Honor's reflections.

One is by deciding to have the 41-witness trial that we had with all of the primary witnesses going in with their direct testimony by declaration, to be clear, Your Honor actually

saved the estate tens of millions of dollars and shortened the trial by probably weeks because if we had 41 witnesses each giving direct testimony, that type of work to actually try to keep costs down is something that we are all keeping our eye on.

I'm guessing we will work harder in subsequent applications to make the lack of duplication and the client's oversight of that yet more to the Court. For example, having done this case largely full time for almost four years, I'm not sure I've ever been on a single conference call with Jones Day or Arnold and Porter to show you how completely different the pipes are, but I know that's not always visible to the Court. The same is actually true in a transposed way, now that I might be on calls with them, with respect to very clear divisions of responsibility between firms like Dechert who are litigation counsel and Davis Polk. So we will work harder to make those lines more clear both to the fee examiner and to the Court, but those are things that the client is very focused on and actually works hard to ensure that frankly, we're not ever having two people do the same thing because that's just not acceptable.

So I just wanted to give the Court comfort that these are things that the client is managing and many of us have been thoughtful about and the like.

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Page 50 1 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. All right, and 2 look, Mr. Herner is a very serious person, as are his professionals. So I, like the US Trustee, take some real 3 comfort in that and in his review, and in addition to the 4 5 fact the U.S. Trustee has not raised objections to any of 6 these fee applications. So I'm really flagging issues just 7 for the future and I'll leave it at that. 8 MR. HUEBNER: Thank you, Your Honor. I assume 9 that covers the Reed Smith application as well, though style 10 has a different procedure approach, also we'll have an 11 agreed reduction. 12 THE COURT: Right. I reviewed each of the 13 applications including that one and including some of the 14 small ones like for tax services and the like. So my 15 remarks cover that. 16 MR. HUEBNER: Understood, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. So unless there's anything 18 else, I think that concludes the hearing today. 19 MR. HUEBNER: It does, Your Honor. Nothing 20 further from the Debtors. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 MR. KLAUDER: Thank you, Your Honor. 23 (Whereupon these proceedings were concluded at 24 11:07:38 AM) 25

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Page 52 1 CERTIFICATION 2 3 I, Sonya Ledanski Hyde, certified that the foregoing 4 transcript is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. 5 6 Sonya M. Ledarski Hyd 7 Sonya Ledanski Hyde 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 Veritext Legal Solutions 20 21 330 Old Country Road 22 Suite 300 Mineola, NY 11501 23 24 25 Date: December 17, 2021